



AMAMIHE: Journal of Applied Philosophy, ISSN: 1597 – 0779, 
Vol. 19, No. 4, 2021 




PEIRCE’S FALLIBILISM: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS AND THE 
REVISITATION OF THE ORIGINS OF FALLIBILISM 
 





This paper thematically analyzes Charles Sanders Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism. Peirce’s 
fallibilism is best construed as an epistemic thesis that tries to correct the excesses of and 
mediate between Cartesian dogmatism and skepticism. Hence, as a theory of epistemic 
justification, it is neither overly confident like foundationalism nor overarchingly cynic 
like skepticism. It grants the possibility for knowledge, yet, this knowledge is not 
foregrounded on absolute warrants. The paper therefore argues that, it is at this juncture 
that the theory runs into the problem of vagueness: if we are not certain at which 
particular point a given piece of information becomes knowledge, how can we know we 
have arrived at it yet? Subsequently, Peirce’s novel introduction of hope (as an epistemic 
principle) and the self-corrective nature of inquiry makes his theory more convincing. 
Thus, we do not need to worry about arriving at the knowledge, because doubt 
necessitates inquiry which in turn is self-corrective. So, the more the inquiry, the surer 
we are of arriving at knowledge. 
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Introduction 
Fallibilism as a term was coined by Peirce in the 19th century although 
philosophers before him specifically the ancient skeptic Philo of Larissa, 
Carneades and perhaps David Hume have grappled with the idea. Fallibilism 
knotted to Peirce is construed as an intellectual attack on foundationalism/ 
dogmatism which calls for a disposition to the possibility that one has made an 
error and a corresponding admittance to give a fair hearing to arguments that 
one’s belief is false – whatsoever the belief is about (Pojman, 2001). 
Peirce’s fallibilism (and in fact, fallibilism as a concept) is the consequent of and a 
remarkable attempt to deal with or manage the challenges caused by uncertainty 
in our efforts to acquire knowledge. Whether he succeeded is what I shall look at. 
In what follows I shall canvass Pierce’s whole idea of fallibilism and in doing so, 
identify and address its shortcomings. I shall discuss, the extent to which 
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Peirce uncertainty renders reasoning or attempts to acquire knowledge, an 
ineffectual tedious work or whether it is an invaluable catalyst that propels 
reasoning, knowledge acquisition or inquiry. Against this backdrop, I shall in 
this paper recapture Peirce’s own expressions of fallibilism and then analyze 
some of its merits and demerits. 
 
Peirce’s Contrite Fallibilism 
Peirce built his idea of fallibilism on the nature of reality, common sense, truth 
and the self-corrective nature of knowledge. How are these elements connected? 
Fallibilism is a method of knowing, thinking and disposition to life. If fallibilism 
is about knowledge, then it is knowledge about how things are or at best appear 
to be (reality). This reality is in turn, consists in how things persistently force 
themselves upon our recognition, where existence is nothing but a matter of 
degree of the universe’s growth. Consequently, neither existence nor reality is 
absolute. More so, truth in this regard, is the belief at the ideal end of inquiry, it 
is the value of a proposition, which in Peirce’s philosophy is an intellectual sign 
that interpose between an object (state of affairs) and an interpretant. Thus, truth 
is relative on the one hand to the conceptual resources of sign users and on the 
other hand restricted by the practical circumstances that relate the object and 
sign users. So, for as long as learning continues and practical circumstances 
change, truth in this sense can never be fixed (Houser, 2006). The learning that 
goes on in this whole process ensures the self-corrective nature of knowledge 
amidst the community of enquirers. If these elements are so construed and can 
be knitted this way, then the place of fallibilism (which is a convergent factor for 
all of them) is palpable. 
Peirce held a broad (as in encompassing) view of fallibilism and a weaker or 
perhaps moderate notion of it. This is most obvious in his 1893 paper on 
fallibilism which those who have collated his works have placed in the 
autobiographical comments gathered as a preface for the Harvard edition: 
…the first step toward finding out is to acknowledge you do not 
satisfactorily know already […] no blight can so surely arrest all 
intellectual growth as the blight of cocksureness […] Indeed, out of a 
contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of 
knowledge, all my philosophy has always seemed to grow.1 
                                                          
1 C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, C. Hartshorne, p. Weis and A. W. Burks (eds.) (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1931-1958), (1. 13-14, c. 1897). NOTE: All subsequent citations of Pierce will be taken from this material 
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Peirce’s fallibilism as a contrite one adds a new idea to epistemology, and that is, 
the notion of humility. For Peirce, this humility is more rueful (contrite) because 
it is as though nature necessarily demands it of us, a difficult lesson learned 
when we must for instance, concede that the earth is not flat after a long time of 
propounding theories from that perspective or from Peirce’s own example, we 
must as though have forced, to accept that heavy bodies do not fall faster than 
light ones despite the common sense of generations. Now the gist of this line of 
thought is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and propositions 
while also justifiably treating an issue as resolved for the purposes of current 
inquiry and action. To put it succinctly, Peirce meant that “people cannot attain 
absolute certainty concerning questions of fact” (CP. 1. 13-14).  
Furthermore, going back to Peirce’s own expressions of fallibilism, he argues that 
we can never anticipate or trust that we can arrive at absolute certainty, absolute 
exactitude, or absolute universality through ratiocination. However, if we cannot 
by reasoning arrive at exactitude, certitude, and universality, then there is no 
other means to reach them; not even by direct experience, intuition of innate 
truths, not by revelation. (CP. 1.142). Thus, “we can never be absolutely sure of 
anything, nor can we with any probability ascertain the exact value of any 
measure or general ratio” (CP. 1.147).  A more vivid definition of fallibilism in 
Peirce’s own words is that: “Fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is 
never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy” (CP. 1.171). 
From these few lines, it can be observed as Susan Haack (2006) did, that Pierce’s 
fallibilism is in one hand, an epistemological thesis (about our predilection to 
hold false beliefs) and on the other, an epistemological recommendation (that we 
should desire to learn and not be satisfied with what we already know). 
Consequently, it seems appropriate to recapture Peirce’s fallibilism as a thesis 
and a recommendation, so in the succeeding sections of this paper, I shall get to 
it. 
 
Peirce’s Fallibilism as an Epistemological Thesis 
The focal point in Peirce’s theory is the limitations of human cognitive tools and 
the cognitive method. While the former points to the incapability of the human 
intellect to view all the possible aspects of an object of enquiry or that no 
infallible intuition, the latter concerns the error that could ensue in measurement 
or uncertainty prefaced by inductive reasoning. For these reasons, Peirce 
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Peirce expanded this theory by trying to avoid the trappings/drawbacks of 
Cartesian foundationalism and skepticism. Thus, Peirce’s fallibilism (as an 
epistemic thesis) can be conceived as in intermediate between dogmatism and 
skepticism. Hence, Haack sharing this view, avers that a proper statement of 
fallibilism in this regard, makes it a thesis about cognitive agents and their wit 
for knowledge and /or belief, which abjures that any of our beliefs is absolutely 
certain, so that it is less confident than dogmatism, while permitting that we do 
have some knowledge, or some justification for our beliefs, in this way it is less 
cynic or despondent than skepticism (Haack, 1979). 
More so, Peirce’s fallibilism as an epistemological thesis incepts as an attack on 
Descartes’s foundationalist epistemology. This is clear in his critique of the said 
epistemology where he instigates that: “no infallible faculty of intuition,” such as 
the Cartesians visioned would provide the substrata of knowledge. He avers on 
the one hand, that we are already repeatedly faulty in matters pertaining the 
claim for infallible intuition; and on the other, even if we were to have such 
power, it could not perform the exact epistemological role (assurance for 
indubitability), because it would require that it be accompanied by a further 
infallible power to distinguish between authentic declarations of intuition and 
those of shammers etc. (CP. 5.213ff; 5.264).  We cannot envision knowledge 
which is perfectly exact, absolutely indisputable or limitlessly universal, Peirce 
agues elsewhere. To envisage the idea that we can have infallible scientific 
knowledge, he retorts, is ‘irresistibly comic’ with regards to the fact that even in 
the most exact sciences careful practicians admit the unavoidability of 
experimental error (CP. 1.8). He also observes that induction always involves 
projection, from particular to the whole specie of the class, and this prefaces an 
inevitable element of uncertainty. He adds that there is irreducible 
indeterminacy in the world, that is, there is no absolute necessary and 
exceptionless law and as a consequence, our knowledge must fall short of 
universality (CP. 1.146).  Finally, in the face of the finite life cycle of scientific 
theories which are either modified or replaced under several innovative 
pressure, Peirce insisted that, we must concede the inability to attain the final 
and definitive truth in the theoretical concerns (and perhaps otherwise) of 
natural sciences (CP. 1.135). 
 
Peirce’s Fallibilism as an Epistemological Recommendation  
Peirce epistemological recommendation is a consequent of the thesis/theory. It is 
an answer to: if we cannot trust our cognitive faculty for absolute certainty, if 
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we do? In the “First Rule of Logic,” Peirce, even though indirectly pointed out 
(his fallibilism) in a passage ushering in his celebrated maxim:  
Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to 
learn you must desire to learn and in so desiring not be satisfied with what 
you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself 
deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy, do not 
block the way of inquiry (CP. 1.135). 
Peirce uses this, as it were, to decry metaphysicians who fall prey to the error of 
being assuaged with what we already tend to think that we lose touch of the 
appetency to learn; and this becomes evident in the following ways: in absolute 
declarations, in propositions that one thing or the other can never be known, in 
claims that perfect truth has been formulated and in claims that something is 
enigmatic (CP. 1.135).  This seems to be about a procedural issue or perchance an 
ethical one. 
The main theme of the ‘recommendation’ to look out for in the above quotation 
is “…do not block the way of inquiry,” it characterizes Peirce’s answer to the 
questions that arise as a result of the fallibilistic thesis, what do we do? 
According to Peirce, we should keep or continue learning. This recommendation 
is a procedural or methodological approach towards the confusion created by the 
lack of an infallible way of knowing and an infallible knowledge.  
Peirce’s recommendation is primarily a charge for intellectual humility and the 
declaration that the root of knowledge cannot in any way stabilize in minds that 
become inimical, impenetrable and prohibitive impediment to new ideas. This is 
underscored by Peirce’s 1893 paper, that: “nothing can be more completely 
contrary to a philosophy the fruit of a scientific life than infallibilism, whether 
arrayed in its ecclesiastical trappings, or under its recent ‘scientistic’ disguise” 
(CP. 1.8). 
From this perspective, Peirce would be seen to state directly and clearly that he 
did not envisage that fallibilism would be a thing agreeable to conservative 
philosophers, those who shudder at thinking outside the box, but to radicals. Not 
to overconfident (‘cocksure,’ in Peirce words) radicals, but to radicals who 
endeavor to experiment and who are eager to accept consequences and willing to 
carry them to their extremes. According to Peirce, such radicals are energized by 
the spirit of science and it is amongst this kind of people that fallibilism will find 
its supporters (CP. 1.148). 
Furthermore, another supposition that connects fallibilism to recommendation is 
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there are cases where some of the beliefs we confidently held have been falsified. 
We have been in error; it is only reasonable to be ready to give up our present 
beliefs should the evidence give a contrary support. Peirce accentuates the 
importance of the realization that we have been faulty when he observes for 
instance, that what we now believe to be mathematical propositions were once 
firmly accepted. Sometimes these errors would remain undetected for long. 
However, when discovered we should be ready to let go (CP. 1.13-14). 
Ultimately, as an epistemological recommendation, Peirce’s fallibilism, calls 
attention to and seeks to avoid what Peirce identified as the “four familiar shapes 
of venomous error that assails our knowledge.” The first is the shape of absolute 
assertion. According to Peirce, fallibilistic position is supposed to avoid such 
overconfident assertions made by science because it contradicts ancient truth that 
presupposes that we can be sure of nothing (CP. 1.136). The second error is that 
which absolutely maintains that some things can never be known [skepticism]. 
This is wrong because we cannot by today’s measure determine for tomorrow 
(CP. 1.39).   
The third error which fallibilism bids us to avoid is the “philosophical stratagem 
that cuts off inquiry by maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science 
is basic, ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable” (CP. 
1.139).  Such a claim is often made not because of a fault in our knowing but 
because there is nothing to know. Peirce observes that such a conclusion can only 
be reached by ‘retroduction.’ Retroductive inference is only justified by its 
affording explanation of the facts. It is however not an explanation to pronounce 
something inexplicable. Consequently, the assertion (that some things are basic 
and inexplicable) is a conclusion that can never be justified (CP. 1.139). Finally, 
the fourth error that fallibilism as a recommendation charges us to avoid is that 
which maintains that this or that law or truth has found its last and perfect 
formulation (CP. 1.140). 
 
Mapping out the Grounds for Peirce’s Fallibilism 
Peirce, to arrive at his doctrine of fallibilism looked at what we call sources of 
knowledge – as in our stack of beliefs or according to Houser (2006), our 
information base– and by the limitations that can be found in them while 
examining each of them, it can be concluded that we can never really have 
universal, exactitude of knowledge or an infallible intuition. This information 
base includes inference, perception, instinct, and can also be extended to insight, 
intuition, testimony, inspiration, revelation and as Peirce would stress il lume 




AMAMIHE: Journal of Applied Philosophy, ISSN: 1597 – 0779, 
Vol. 19, No. 4, 2021 
Department of Philosophy, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria 
 
2004). In what follows I shall try at best to highlight them, briefly and succinctly I 
shall consider whether any one of them can give us anything more than a fallible 
knowledge or a fallible ground for one. 
It would be good to start with perception which is the intellectual progeny of the 
late enlightenment epistemologists. According to them, it is through perception 
that we acquire most of our knowledge. Even Peirce conceptualized this in his 
claim: “the elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action” (CP. 5.212).  So, it 
would not be a mistake to suppose that this is the main source of scientific or 
theoretical knowledge (our accumulated store of intellectual interpretants) 
(Houser, 2006). Hence, is there any product of perception that seems immune to 
fallibility? The answer is possibly no, even though perception does not admit to 
the fallibility of its own production. 
Perception according to Houser, appears to encompass the sensory-cognitive 
process that commences in sense impressions and ends with perceptual 
judgment. Accordingly, neither the sense impression nor the percept expresses 
anything that we can add to the stack of information or that we can reason from, 
so we are left with perceptual judgment as a source of knowledge that begins in 
sensory experience. Now, perceptual judgments are judgments and judgments 
are products/conclusions of inference (Houser, 2006). According to Peirce, 
“abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of 
demarcation between them,” so much that, perceptual judgments are to be 
conceived as extreme cases of abductive inferences” (CP. 5.181).  These 
judgments later become a referent (first premises) from which during the course 
of our experience, we are able to draw more and more remote conclusions and 
fill out our stack of information. However, knowledge through this medium 
cannot be immune to fallibilism unless abduction is an infallibly truth-functional 
process of inference. Definitely it is not. In all, knowledge based on perception 
cannot possibly be immune to the possibility of error because, Peirce argues that, 
it is sourced from something (perceptual judgment) that is a subconscious 
process and not amenable to logical criticisms (CP. 5.181).  Something we cannot 
tell if it is true or not, how can we tell if it is mistaken or not? This is why 
perception cannot just be considered infallible. 
Furthermore, on inference as a source of knowledge, Peirce taught that there are 
three distinct types of inferences, viz; deduction, induction and abduction. 
Deduction is commonly believed to be better candidate for infallibility. 
According to Houser, if Quantitative induction seems to be infallible, it is only so 
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because neither one of them is a source of knowledge. According to Peirce, 
“Deduction explicates; Induction evaluates: that is all” (CP. 6.475).  So, it would 
seem that every effort to bridge the gap between our pristine desires and 
scientific knowledge is laid by abduction alone and if it cannot give us 
infallibility then no other form of inference can. Why is this so? Recall that 
deduction (and by extension abduction) supposes or promises that if we can start 
from infallible premises at least we can be assured of preserving our infallibility. 
The problem however is that, if we can never be certain that we have not made a 
mistake, how then can we be certain that our line of reasoning is immune to 
error? (CP. 5.181; 1.181) 
Given the failure of inference to afford us infallibility, we turn to revelation. 
According to Peirce, revelation constitutes by far the most uncertain class of 
truths (CP. 1.143).  Peirce objected to the claim that revelation can give us 
infallible knowledge for three reasons: first we cannot be certain that any 
deliverance (or religious experiences) is inspired for that can only be ascertained 
by reasoning and since reasoning is liable to error we cannot ascribe infallibility 
to deliverance (or religious experiences). Secondly, even if deliverance (religious 
experiences) is inspired, we can never ascertain if the human language that 
conveyed them are true. After all, all inspired matter has been subject to human 
distortion or colouring. God might as well see reason to inspire falsity (pointing 
to our limitation to understand even what is directly from God). Likewise, (third 
reason), a truth which rest on the authority of inspiration only is of a somewhat 
incomprehensible nature; and we never can be sure that we rightly comprehend 
it (CP. 1.143). 
More so, Peirce considered laws which are known to us a priori: the axioms of 
geometry, the principles of logic, the maxims of causality etc. These are 
ordinarily thought to be absolutely certain without exception and exact. 
However, Peirce argues that there is positive historic proof which suggests that 
innate truths are particularly uncertain and mixed up with error and as a result 
“a fortiori not without exception” (CP. 1.143).  He did concede that this supposed 
historical proof is not infallible only that it is a strong pointer. The point Peirce is 
making here is that a priori truth cannot afford us infallible knowledge because 
we come to know it a priori, that is, we take a priori judgments at their own 
valuation, without criticism or credentials (CP. 1.143). Thus, we cannot just on 
the face value ascribe infallibility to such truths (even though that is what is 
ordinarily done) and if we cannot ascribe infallibility, there is literally no other 
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Similarly, Peirce claims that we cannot even ascribe fallibility to direct 
experience. This is because direct experience can neither be certain nor uncertain, 
it affirms nothing – it just is (CP. 1.143).  There are delusions, hallucinations and 
even dreams, all of which could be experienced. But they do not really appear. 
Direct experience, for Peirce, simply means the appearance. Hence it involves no 
error, because it testifies to nothing but its own appearance. For the same reason, 
it affords no certainty. It is not exact, because it leaves much vague; although it is 
not inexact either, Peirce by this means, it has no false exactitude (CP. 1.143). 
Finally, by looking at these various supposed sources of knowledge and 
discovering that, come what may, neither is prone to error; Peirce concludes that 
no knowledge claim can be said to be infallible. In all, all knowledge claim is 
susceptible to being mistaken.  
 
Peirce’s Fallibilism and the Problem of Vagueness  
The problem of vagueness is that which underscores a predicate that has 
borderline cases. For example, the predicate “is short” is vague because there 
seems to be no particular height at which someone or something is considered 
short (Sorenson, 2018). Accordingly, a predicate is said to be vague if there are 
borderline cases of its application that arouses faultless disagreement over 
whether the predicate applies. The disagreement over whether a religious sister 
is a “nun” is vague. This simply means that there is no sharp distinguishing 
factor that makes one particular thing to be the case as against being another 
thing. 
Now Peirce’s fallibilism might as well be leading us into such a problem. Peirce’s 
fallibilism is committed to the view that there is some specific level of 
justification that is less conclusive but that nonetheless suffices for knowledge as 
it alters our cognitive situation in an important way as to constitute knowledge 
(CP. 1.151). That is, it is not exact, yet it can make up for knowledge. When 
considering for example, whether p is true, it can be granted how finding 
increasingly high levels of justification for the claim that p improves our 
cognitive situation by making it more likely that our belief is true. However, the 
idea that there is some specific level at which our cognitive situation transforms 
from not-knowing to knowing is implausible in the context of a system that only 
requires a less-conclusive level of justification. If knowledge is only probable, 
what then is the different between knowing and not-knowing? At what point can 
we now say a thing is known? If we cannot be certain of anything, how can we 
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 We can illustrate this problem by thinking of probability (since according to 
Peirce, we only need probable justification) as measured by the use of decimals 
in the interval [0, 1]. In this example, a probability of 0 means that a claim is 
certainly false and a probability of 1 means that the claim is guaranteed to be 
true. Now, the problem is this, how probable must one’s belief be to qualify as 
knowledge? Since no precise specification of the exact point has been suggested, 
by Peirce, let alone generally accepted. In fact, to even attempt to provide such a 
precise specification will lead to two difficulties: 1) any point lower than 1 seems 
arbitrary (why that precisely?); 2) it is not clear while achieving such level would 
make any difference. 
This problem can further be illustrated by asking for example, when exactly does 
one who is bald becomes bald? Obviously, someone with 10,000 hairs is not bald 
and clearly someone with no hairs on his head is bald. But at what point does a 
person go from being ‘not-bald’ to ‘bald’? So, must there be less than 100 hairs on 
his head? Less than 98? Etc. It is reasonable to suppose there is no precise point at 
which someone goes from being not-bald to bald: the property bald is vague. 
Accordingly, this form of sorites-style reasoning leads to absurd conclusions. So, 
it is either no one is bald or everyone is bald. Thus, if we presuppose that an 
increase in probability of 0.01 [for example] can never make the difference 
between not-knowing and knowing, then this reasoning will illustrate that there 
is no such thing as knowledge, since someone with conclusive justification 
would still lack knowledge. 
Overarching Inconsistencies in Peirce’s Theory of Fallibilism 
One of the essential issues to consider when dealing with Peirce’s fallibilism is 
the extent to which we can apply it on our beliefs (or knowledge claims). Is our 
entire claim to knowledge fallible? Is all our factual, theoretical and mathematical 
believes fallible? Or are there exceptions? To be sure, Peirce’s ultimate thesis is 
that absolute certainty about “all knowledge” is impossible. 
There seems to be a disharmony in what Peirce thought regarding these 
questions. Peirce’s general stance on fallibilism, is cumbersome to harmonize 
with his other acclaimed theories. For example, his notion of mathematics and 
mathematical truth do not always and in all instances agree with his fallibilism. 
In one place he would claim mathematical truths are infallible and in other 
places claim they are not. 
Peirce considers mathematics as the science that draws necessary conclusions. 
Thus, it contrasts logic, which is the science of drawing necessary conclusions. 
Mathematics is prior to logic. Therefore, as Peirce claims, logic studies what 
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supplies the theory of validity of its arguments, for those arguments are more 
evident than any such theory could be. Furthermore, that mathematics draws 
necessary conclusions means that it draws conclusions which follow necessarily 
from their premises and that it draws conclusions which are necessary in 
themselves (CP. 2. 120ff; 4. 228ff).  Furthermore, according to Peirce, mathematics 
is not concerned with truth at all, but only with the consequences of hypotheses. 
Accordingly, mathematical truths are necessary because they follow necessarily 
from premises which are themselves necessary (CP. 3.558). Mathematical truths 
are hypothetical because they are idealizations, abstractions from real-world 
problems. Hence, mathematical truths are about hypothetical state of things and 
it is in that way alone that their being necessity can be explained (CP. 3.558). 
Conversely, other kinds of beliefs, truths or knowledge claims are not necessary 
like mathematical truths because they make claim of real state of affairs (or actual 
state of things) and as a result they can be known to be apodictically true of an 
actual state of things. Whereas, even if mathematical truth happens to be drawn 
from hypothesis which is true of an actual state, it can never be known 
apodictically to be true of an actual state of things (CP. 3.558).  This is the reason 
why mathematical truths can actually escape our faulty sources of knowledge (as 
has been discussed above) whereas our claim to knowledge of facts cannot.  
Nonetheless, the problem here is that mathematical truth conceived and 
expressed in this way is infallible. It goes against the claim that we can never be 
absolutely sure of anything (CP. 1.147).  More or less, we cannot be sure of 
anything yet we can be sure of mathematical truths: “It would be quite 
misunderstanding the doctrine of fallibilism to suppose that it means that twice 
two is probably not exactly four…It only says that people cannot attain absolute 
certainty concerning questions of fact” (CP. 1.149). Despite this, in another one of 
his lectures, Peirce made this statement that does not agree with his already 
established belief about mathematical truths: 
Let me ask whether any individual here present thinks there is room for 
possible doubt that twice two is four? How does any individual here 
know but that I am a hypnotist, and that when he comes out of my 
influence, he may see that twice two is four is merely his distorted idea? 
(CP. 3.558) 
Consequently, there seems to be a problem on how far Peirce admits that 
fallibilism can go. He punctuates at one place that our beliefs may be mistaken, 
that our beliefs can never be absolutely certain and we should be ready to revise 
our beliefs (CP. 1.155), observe that the ‘beliefs’ has no exception. He also alluded 
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mathematical beliefs. Yet elsewhere, he believes that mathematical truths are 
necessary and this necessity obviates the possibility of our being mistaken in our 
mathematical beliefs; for when for example in Collected Papers, 7.108 (1892) and 
1.248 (1902) he avers that fallibilism does protract even to mathematics he is 
decoyed to compromise his consignment to the necessity of mathematical truths, 
and to point that mathematical inference is, after all, only probable, and when in 
another place, Collected Paper 1.149 (1897), he accentuates the necessary 
temperament of mathematical truths, he likewise points that we are fallible only 
in our factual beliefs.  
This disagreement is also observed when we he conceptualizes contingent truth. 
That is, when he conceded that ‘all’ our beliefs are fallible and yet turn to the 
other side and say contingent truth (e.g., “I am in shock”) are necessary and 
cannot be fallible or that there are some truths that are necessary. The only way 
to solve this problem is to from the onset claim that some beliefs are fallible while 
some are infallible. In this way, the only concern will be discerning and 
distinguishing those truths that are fallible from those that are not. However, this 
is not Peirce’s avowal. In fact, he was radical to the extent that he also stresses 
that his doctrine of fallibilism is also fallible (CP. 1.151). 
The problem here is that, why the hesitance from Peirce in both granting 
fallibilism and the necessity of mathematical truths? Why can they not be made 
compatible? Susan Haack (1979) addresses this question well: “why should one 
not allow that we may hold false mathematical beliefs, and at the same time 
grant that mathematical truths are necessarily true?” To be sure, if mathematical 
truths are necessarily true, it follows, that if we hold false mathematical beliefs, 
those beliefs are false necessarily.  
Peirce needed not to have had scruples, in any case about whether to ascribe 
fallibility to mathematical truths. Even there be, truths that are mathematically 
and logically necessary, they are independent to the possibility that we might 
erroneously conceive them to be untrue. Put in another way, we can dissimilate 
the logical or objective certainty of necessary propositions from our 
psychological or subjective certainty in conceiving those propositions. Hence a 
fallibilist in agreement with Peirce’s line of thought can actually concede that 
unsullied mathematical beliefs are objectively certain but would reject that it is 
subjectively certain (Haack, 1979). This is because we can conceive them 
wrongly.  
From the beginning of this section, we have been seeing the shortcomings of or 
inconsistences in Peirce’s fallibilism. These shortcomings [can] result in doubt 
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fail to realize the hold of uncertainty in our knowledge acquisition. The 
mathematical dilemma I treated in this section illustrates typically the hold 
uncertainty have over our methods of inquiry. Here we are looking at the 
panacea given to us by Peirce (fallibilism) to manage the overarching influence of 
uncertainty, yet even in this attempt there appears to be shortcomings that 
would lead us to back our drawing board in dealing with uncertainty. In fact, 
this is an obnoxious epistemic problem. However, it becomes complicated when 
we consider that it is as a result of doubt(uncertainty) that we can only hope to 
arrive at a better or fine-tuned version of Peirce’s fallibilism as we saw in the 
effort to reconcile Peirce’s fallibilism and the necessity of mathematical truth. 
Nevertheless, if there was no reason to doubt Peirce’s fallibilism, there would not 
be a need for fine-tuning. Doubt seems to only keep this tedious task of inquiry 
going. So, is inquiry needless because of doubt that could result from it? Should 
we entangle ourselves with doubt or close the door to inquiry?  These questions 
and others like them are what we hope to answer in the next sections. In all, not 
doubting seems to be an impediment to inquiry as much as Peirce’s decried 
cocksureness (CP. 1. 13-14). 
Doubt and Hope in Peirce’s Fallibilism 
In the heart of Peirce’s pragmatic theory of enquiry (fallibilism) lies doubt and 
hope. Doubt is inevitable; doubt is understandable. Doubt, uncertainty or 
disbelief is not just a disposition compelled on us by ill-fated or calamitous 
limitations of human cognition and its corresponding processes. Rather, 
according to Peirce, real inquiry is the only fountain of Peircean knowledge; and 
we only inquire when we experience authentic doubt (CP. 3.558). Thus, doubt 
about one’s own beliefs is the power plant under the cowl of philosophical 
investigation. It necessitates our knowledge generation.  
Furthermore, Cooke, emphasizing Peirce’s concerns for doubt, approvingly and 
repeatedly asserts that all inquiry must be actuated by actual doubts that some 
humans really hold: 
The irritation of doubt…results in a suspension of the individual’s 
previously held habit of action. Since the doubt is an irritation and since it 
causes a suspension of action, the individual works to rid herself of the 
doubt through inquiry. The doubt motivates the inquiry and gives the 
inquiry its purpose. The particular purpose of each inquiry is dictated by 
the particular doubt which has risen for the individual (2006) 
This doubt is different from Cartesian doubt because it is real. It is necessitated 
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been observed from such state of affairs (or beliefs). Cartesian doubt on the other, 
hand is merely a systematic doubt (or as it is commonly known, paper doubt). It 
is a framed doubt because even if there is actually no cause to doubt, we still 
have to doubt. Accordingly, while Peirce’s doubt is brought about by perceived 
failures of the present beliefs, Cartesian doubt incepts by identifying what can be 
doubted in the present beliefs. Therefore, while the doubt needed in Peirce’s 
fallibilism is extemporaneous, that in Cartesian doubt is planned and anticipated.  
Hence, genuine doubt gives rise to the purpose of an inquiry. If this is true, then 
the purpose of Peirce’s fallibilism must have been prompted by some particular 
doubt. However, it is warranted that we ask: what was Peirce’s purpose of 
inquiry? What kind of authentic doubt really prompted him to spend time 
building his fallibilist doctrines in the philosophy of knowing? A mere 
reconstruction of his thesis will leave these questions unanswered because it is 
more interested in the context of justification for his doctrine. Context discovery 
on the other hand, which ought to provide answers for these questions, will lead 
us into pure speculations; except Peirce tells us himself what prompted his 
inquiry. In all, it seems we will never know and perhaps we will keep being 
challenged by doubt. 
At this juncture, we can now turn to the idea of Hope. Hope in Peirce’s 
philosophy, is some sort of epistemological disposition adopted to meliorate the 
overarching effects of doubt and error in our quest for knowledge (CP. 1.150; 
2.654; 2.655). This is corroborated by the “orthodox definition’ of hope, which 
defines it in terms of a wish or desire for an outcome and a belief concerning the 
outcome’s possibility (Martin, 2013; Meirav, 2009).2 Similarly, it is expressed as: 
“A hopes that p” is true iff “A wishes that p, and A thinks that p has some degree 
of probability, however small” is true (Day, 1969). 
What role might this play in Pierce’s fallibilism? In Peirce, despite the fact that 
thinkers are motivated by their own sense of fallibility, they are also encouraged 
by the “hope” in the possibility that we have knowledge and can arrive at it (CP. 
1.150; 2.654; 2.655). Therefore, hope rather than truth is the proper goal of 
inquiry. This is because, we cannot claim the truth when it is possible that it 
might change in the future, rather inquiry leads us to that position where we 
have hope that is rational enough to help us accept that our belief at the moment 
is true (CP. 1.150; 2.654; 2.655). 
Ultimately, in Peirce’s fallibilism, doubts and errors make it unlikely that we 
know; hope on the other hand, gives the reason that what we already have can 
                                                          
2 NOTE: These scholars share Peirce’s belief that “hope” has epistemic standard. That is, hope can be rational as 
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pass for knowledge (CP. 1.150; 2.654; 2.655).  Hope is an epistemic virtue that 
inquirers have to imbibe in the face of the challenges of doubt. It is the only 
commensurate and compatible catholicon suited for the problem at hand. For 
Peirce and all Peircean fallibilists and probably contemporary fallibilists of all 
kinds, hope is a principle of genuine inquiry and it is the first principle against 
uncertainty in genuine inquiry. We only hope that the knowledge at hand is 
right; that the basic suppositions upon which our inquiry is built is right despite 
the ultimate challenges of doubt/uncertainty. 
 
Peirce’s Community of enquirers and the Self Corrective Process 
An essential element towards constructing Peirce’s fallibilism and its eventual 
comprehension is the salient role and disposition of the community of inquirers. 
So, if knowledge is not a onetime ‘get and grab’ enterprise as we saw when we 
were exposing Peirce’s fallibilism then it falls to this community to always keep 
attempting to dispel uncertainty. 
Peirce’s community of inquirers is the scientific community whose job it is to 
investigate matters of fact which impress on us. The members of this community 
perpetuate inquiry and determine the direction our quest for knowledge should 
take. For Peirce, the quest for knowledge is communitarian. It is the collective 
and co-operative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to 
find out the truth, whose lives are animated by “an impulse to penetrate into the 
reason of things” (CP.1.44; 6.15). The members of this community were to be 
Peirce’s co-inquirers who are animated by rueful sense of their own inclination to 
error. They are the ones who experience genuine doubt and hope that their 
present working thesis is true. 
The idea of fallibilism is hinged on the activities (investigations) of the members 
of this community. Since, knowledge grows, this community ensures it. The 
mistakes of the community at one epoch are corrected by the ingenuity of the 
members of the community at another epoch. For this reason, Peirce, thinks that 
the fallibility of the community in one epoch does not encumber scientific 
progress. Hence, the scientific community is not limited but it also extends to all 
races of peoples who can come into immediate intellectual relation (CP. 2.654; 
1.150). 
Underlying these whole community inquiring processes is the self-corrective 
process of ordinary scientific reasoning: “the more one learns the more one 
corrects one’s presuppositions” (CP. 1.244). Peirce also claims that this is not only 
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William Davis (1972), observes that if this is true, then philosophical skepticism 
will be rendered futile, so will the ratio-deductive method, and as a result 
inductive or ‘scientific’ method will be confirmed. 
Peirce in responding to how all thoughts correct themselves given that deduction 
appears not to be self-corrective at all, but seems to lead further away from the 
truth, gives a diagrammatic example: 
Imagine a column of figures to be added. No one adding them together, 
unless he is very accustomed to doing sums, will be absolutely sure that 
the result is accurate, and, if accuracy is very important, he will want to 
add it up a couple of times or use one of the systems designed to check 
addition (CP. 1. 248). 
 However, what in the world is this but taking a vote, a sample? This, Davis 
claims, is actually a form of induction. The same thing applies to any deductive 
chain. In a geometrical proof one equally feels compelled to go back and check 
the reasoning. To be sure, a deduction is theoretically infallible [recall the 
arguments above], but this is never anything more than a theoretical infallibility. 
In practice, error may creep into even the simplest deduction - in fact errors are 
every so often found in mathematical proofs of the most rigorous kind which 
had been thought accurate for generations (CP. 1. 248). – [this argument again]. 
Accordingly, the whole line of reasoning, as Peirce would have us think, is 
strengthened by all the arguments Peirce used in the Faculties to illustrate that all 
reasoning must be fallible because of the fact that thinking is a process in time. 
What then is Peirce’s contention that the reasoning process, the more it is sought, 
tends not only to correct its conclusions, but also even the premises from which it 
incepts. Peirce on this note remarks: 
The theory of Aristotle is that a necessary conclusion is just equally as 
certain as its premises, while a probable conclusion is somewhat less so. 
Hence, he was driven to his strange distinction between what is better 
known to Nature and what is better known to us. But where every 
probable inference less certain than its premises, science, which piles 
inference upon inference, often quite deeply, would soon be in a bad way. 
Every astronomer, however, is familiar with the fact that the catalogue 
place of a fundamental star, which is the result of elaborate reasoning, is 
far more accurate than any of the observations from which it was deduced 
(CP. 5.575). 
Not only this, Pierce at several times asserts that not only can reason correct the 
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further gives an example of even a mathematical process into which random 
errors may be incurred, but which tends to correct itself the longer it is pursued. 
He conceded that the process of correcting premises is not, “so sure, or at least so 
expeditious,” in a deductive chain as in an inductive argument but he still retains 
that even deduction is self-corrective. This whole process can be deduced from 
the examples he gave by the active participation of the members of the scientific 
community who would constantly and persistently subject their reasoning 
processes to careful criticisms. From this persistent, careful subjection comes 
certainty (if we could say - provisionally). Hence, “the certainty of mathematical 
reasoning, however, lies in this, that once an error is suspected, the whole world 
is speedily in accord about it” (CP. 5.577). 
In sum, the whole idea appears to be that wherever one begins to reason, no 
matter if on an entirely false premise, the process of continuing to think long 
enough will slowly begin to identify and erase error as a self-consistent or 
distinct picture begins to emerge. This is off course, happening under the 
axiomatic maxim of the scientific method, which canonizes that one continually 
checks one’s reasoning against experience, and not dictate to the world on the 
assumption that man’s reasoning power is so strong that it can go unhindered 
from truth to truth. Therefore, according to Davis (1972), it does not matter how 
one begins to deal with a problem, whether for fear of not knowing how to start 
or that of starting from a wrong foot, all that matters is that one begins the 
process, because reasoning tends to grow and correct itself as it goes along. After 
all, Peirce says that the phenomenon of self-correction “is a property so deeply 
saturating [inquiry’s] inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is but one 
thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active desire to learn 
what is true (CP. 5. 582). 
 
Conclusion  
In this paper, I attempted to canvass the structures that constitutes Peirce’s 
fallibilism and by doing so identified some problems with his theory. The 
chapter has shown that Peirce’s claim that knowledge need not be exact arouses 
the problem of vagueness about the status of the justification needed for it. 
Furthermore, I also looked at the distinguishing element of Peirce’s fallibilism, 
and that is nothing more than a contrite approach to learning in the face of all the 
limitations of our cognitive processes, methods and instruments. Consequently, 
the paper has been able to show that: 
1. As an epistemological thesis, fallibilism recognizes that no matter how 
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possibility that we might be erroneous or wrong in holding them. 
Accordingly, as an epistemological recommendation, fallibilism, urges and 
advocates that we keep building on what we already think we know, we 
should be building on what we already hold, we should learn and learning 
is continuous. 
2. Knowledge acquisition is an overarching process that calls for somewhat 
humility; that results from the fact that we might always and everywhere 
be wrong. The main point for Peirce is that the way of sincere inquiry 
should never be blocked. 
3. There is no certain or infallible claim to knowledge because our supposed 
sources of knowledge are liable to errors. 
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